Sartre’s Absolute Freedom by Campbell, Gerard T.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Sartre’s Absolute Freedom"
 
Gerard T. Campbell
Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 33, n° 1, 1977, p. 61-91.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/705594ar
DOI: 10.7202/705594ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 03:49
SARTRE'S ABSOLUTE FREEDOM 
Gerard T. CAMPBELL 
Freedom is not a being; it is the being of man-i.e. 
his nothingness of being. If we start by conceiving 
of man as a plenum, it is absurd to try and find in 
him afterwards moments or psychic regions in 
which he would be free. As weil look for empti-
ness in a container which one has filled be-
forehand up to the brim! Man can not be some-
times slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and 
forever free or he is not free at ail. 
Jean-Paul SARTRE.! 
F reedom is a problem for each of us in the measure that we are concerned 
with our human condition. As such, it is not surprising to discern that history 
shows so many great minds grappling with the problem; but history also bears 
evidence to William James' admonition that the juice has not yet been squeezed 
out of the problem. 2 James' comment, in fact, makes it worthwhile to ask if the 
juice can ever be squeezed out? One might be tempted to answer with an optimis-
tic 'yes' were the problem an objective one. But the problem is perennial precisely 
because we are subjects and each of us, as a person, must come to grips with 
himself and his purpose in life. So while it is good to study and learn from those 
who have already examined the problem, their solutions can have value for us 
only in so far as we interiorize and make our own what they have of worth to give. 
The problem will never be resolved once for ail: it is raised anew as each person 
strives to situate himself and the human condition. 
In this context it is especially worthwhile to examine Sartre's Being and 
NothinJ?lless. ln a contemporary way, Sartre speaks to contemporary man-as an 
individual to individuals. There is a certain proportion between a world in which 
shared values are less corn mon , a world of disoriented individuals, unsatisfied and 
dissatisfied, and Sartre's thesis that freedom consists in absolute indeterminism. 
This very malaise which should compel us to search for a perspective on our-
selves and the human condition is carefully dealt with by Sartre; but in Sartre this 
l. Bein!? and No/hingness, Ir. Hazel E. Barnes (New York. 1%6), p. 539. 
2. "The Dilemma of Determinism". Essays in Pragma/ism (New York. 1948), p. 37. 
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malaise is not his point of departure, but his conclusion. Consequently, those who 
seek purpose and meaning to their lives should find it worth the effort to examine 
carefully those foundations upon which Sartre's conclusions are built. 
Sartre himself takes great pains to carefully expose and justify these founda-
tions in Being and Nothingness. It may even be because of his attentive analysis 
that the work will endure. However, what is important for those concerned with 
the problem is to follow Sartre's own procedure, to trace his footsteps through 
Being and Nothingness. in order to understand the causes of the perspective on 
man which he portrays. To unravel the knot one must see how it is tied. 
But there are difficulties. A considerable degree of benevolence and patience 
is required of the reader in approaching BeÎng and Nothinfifless. The ditTiculty of 
maintaining interest in the work has much to do with Sartre's starting point. 
'Everyone is alone, each of us is "de trop", we are ail bastards'-such is the 
order of conclusions which appear in Sartre's novels and plays.3 We are ail bas-
tards in the sense that we do not belong. that we are eut off from, and other than 
the world, that we do not have a proper place in the world. Such radical conclu-
sions are dependent on a correspondingly radical starting point. 
Berdyaev's distinction between the cosmocentric and the anthropocentric 
perspective is a helpful one in grasping Sartre' s point of departure. 4 Traditionally, 
philosophy was cosmocentric; its focus was on the world of nature and causality. 
Within this context, man was se en in tenns of his nature and where he belonged or 
'fit in' with the rest of the world. The focal point of modern philosophy, however, 
is anthropocentric; its concern is with man the subject. in his subjectivity-an 
autonomous self discovered in confrontation with and in contradistinction to the 
object-world. This anthropocentric context and an emphasis on man as anti-
physis provides a perspective on Sartre' s assertion that existentialism is a 
humanist philosophy: 
by existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in 
addition, declares that every truth and every action implies a human setting 
and a human subjectivity. 5 
It is with isolated subjectivity that Sartre begins-and subjectivity means that 
"first of ail, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and only afterwards, 
defines himself. "6 Sartre involves his reader in a dilemma from the very outset: 
what have we to learn from an existing individual who is stripped of any notion of 
human nature and is portrayed as only a factual entity, a particular and isolated 
consciousness, in a situation, engaged in the task of making himself exist as self? 
It is for this reason that the reader must be bene vole nt and patient-in spite of 
Sartre. But for those willing to make the effort, the rewards can be great. 
3. Cf. Francis Jeanson. Sartre par lui-même (Paris. 19551. p. 83. 
4. Cf. Nicolas Berdyaev. Dream al1d Reality. Ir. Katherine Lampert (London. 1950). pp. 104 et 
seq. Aiso Solitude lll1d SocielY, tr. George Reavey (London. 1947). pp. JO et seq. 
5. Existel1tialism. tr. Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1947), p. 12. 
6. Ibid" p. 18. 
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ln Being and Nothingness Sartre sees the phenomenological method as an 
indispensable instrument for his philosophical presentation of the nature of free-
dom. To grasp Sartre's philosophy of subjectivity we must first understand 
this phenomenological method-beginning, as does Sartre, with an analysis of 
the procedure which he utilizes in developing his position. 
Sartre proclaims at the outset of Being and Nothingness that the great prog-
ress of modem thought lies in having reduced the existent to phenomenon. 7 In the 
popuIar conception of kantian philosophy, the existent is a combination of 
phenomenon (the appearance of the thing, the way in which it is grasped in sense 
experience) and noumenon (the inner reaIity, the essence, the whatness of sub-
stance underlying the appearances). Sartre. following Husserl, discards the 
noumenon as a useless hypothesis: there is no noumenal reality underlying 
phenomena, . 'for the being of an existent is exactly what it appears.' '8 Its essence 
is the aggregate of appearances. 
To speak of the appearances of things, however, supposes a someone to 
whom they appear; a subject or, more precisely, a consciousness. Phenomenon 
and consciousness, therefore, must be seen as co-relative. As a result, the 
phenomenological perspective demands two notions: a) the description of what 
appears as it appears and b) that of a consciousness which describes whatever 
appears in ils sphere. 
Husserl's phenomenology was one of meanings resulting from analysis of the 
descriptions of appearances. Sartre insists that we delve much deeper. It is neces-
sary, he tells us, to go beyond the meanings of the appearances to the existence of 
this world which "appears" to us: "knowledge cannot by itselfgive an account of 
being; that is, the being of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the phenomenon 
of being. "9 If there is to be any ground, any foundation for knowledge 
(phenomenological) then we must abandon a position which asserts the primacy of 
knowledge. If the existence of what appears to consciousness is reducible to the 
appearance of what exists, then phenomenology loses its foothold in reality and 
becomes merely another form of idealism. The existence of the world must be 
taken out of brackets. 
Sartre's escape from idealism to a foundation in real being for 'that which 
appears' results from an intricate analysis of consciousness. Sartre has already 
emphasized that phenomenon and consciousness are co-relative. From this base 
he carefully shows that 'the known' refers to knowledge "and knowledge to the 
being who knows (in his capacity as being, not as being known)." 10 This conclu-
sion aligns Sartre with Husserl in rejecting as fictive the priority of the Cartesian 
cogito. There is no such thing as a mere consciousness. "Ali consciousness is 
7. Op. cit., p.1 iii. 
8. Ibid .. p. liv. 
9. Ibid .. p. lix. 
10. Ibid .. p. Ix. 
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consciousness of something," II that is, there is always a certain content to con-
sciousness, always a positing of a transcendent object. "Ali knowing conscious-
ness can be knowledge only of its object." 12 
For a knowing consciollsness to be knowledge (~r its object, however, it is a 
necessary condition that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge; that 
is, it must also be self-consciollsness. 13 But even in this self-consciollsness, con-
sciousness retlects on its consciousness of something. This consciousness (~r 
something (the foundation of self-consciollsness) Sartre calls the pre-re.f7ective 
('ogito: 
Retlection has no kind of primacy ovei' the consciousness retlected-on. It is 
not retlection which reveals the consciousness retlected-on to itself. Quite the 
contrary, it is the non-retlective consciousness which renders the retlection 
possible; there is a pre-retlective cogito which is the condition of the Car-
te sian cogitO. 14 
We mmt not think of the Cartesian cogito, therefore, as sorne new COIl-
sciollsness which assumes as its object a consciousness until then lInconscious of 
itself. Nor is ref1ective consciousness, through which the being of the knower is 
revealed, a quality of the pre-retlective cogito. It is "the oniy mode (~f existence 
which is possible for a conscÏousness of something." 15 The Cogito is the revela-
tion of consciousness to itself (the being of self ta self) in terms of its being. 
In this perspective there is no way to conceive of the Cogito as a substance 
impregnated with a content which cornes ta il. Consciousness is not possible 
before being-it cannot be prior to its own existence-rather, the cogito deter-
mines itself in the act of consciousness. "Its being is the source and condition of 
ail possibility" and, therefore, "its existence implies its essence . ., 16 The determi-
nation of consciousness by itself results from the 'of something' through which 
consciollsness reveals its being to itself. "It can be limited only by itself." 17 ln 
itself, consciollsness is a plenum of existence-its determination of itself by itself 
in any given moment is its essence. 
ln abandoning the "1 think. therefore, 1 am" of Descartes, and the primacy of 
knowledge, we discover the being of the knower and encounter the absolute. 1S 
"The existence of consciousness cornes from consciousness itself." 19 Becallse 
this absolllte is one of existence and not of knowledge, it is not a logical construc-
tion (and so we escape idealism), but the sllbject of experience. Furthermore, as 
II. Ihid .. p. 1 xi. 
12. Ihid. 
13. " ... There must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself." p. 1 xii. Also, 
" ... every positional consciousness of an object is at the same lime a non-positional conscioLls-
ness of itself." 
14. IiJid., p. 1 xiii. 
15. Ihid., p. lxiv. 
16. Ihid., p. Iv. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Cf. Ihid., p. 1 xvii. 
19. IiJid .• p. Ixvi. 
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an absolute, it is not rel(lti~'e to the experience which reveals it because it is this 
expelience. And again, sincc this absolute asserts the primacy of exisrence over 
essence, it can ne ver be conceived as substance. Such is the first order of conclu-
sions, the first realm of being, the being-of-the-subject revealed by the 
phenomenological method. 
But From the being-of-the-subject, from the being of the pre-reflective cogito. 
Sartre leads us by means of 'an ontological proof' to another domain of being, the 
being-of-the-world. 
To arrive at this second domain of being Sartre returns to the affirmation that 
"ail consciollsness is consciousness of something.'· Now this proposition can be 
understood in two senses: either consciousness constitutes the being of the object 
or consciousness is a relation to a transcendent being. The ftrst interpreation is 
self-destructive: if consciousness constitutes its object the result wou Id be a con-
sciousness attempting to distinguish itself from something which is nothing. And 
sin ce being cannot arise out of non-being. this interpretation must be dismissed. 
This leaves us the second interpretation. If consciousness is consciousness of 
something. then this 'something' is not consciousness itself but something other 
them itself-an external object: 
This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; 
that is, that consciousness is born sllpported by being which is not itself. This 
is what we call the ontological proof. 20 
If Descartes had a difficult task in this attempt to reach the external world (via 
God and His truthfulness). a difficulty due to his insistence on the primacy of 
knowledge, Sartre. using the pre-reflective cogito, hopes to avoid the dilemma. 
He claims to establish from his analysis of consciousness an immediate foothold in 
reality and an immediate affirmation of its existence. 21 Since ail consciousness is 
consciousness of something, consciousness must produce itself as a revealed-
revel:ltion of something which is other than consciousness and which is presented 
as already existing when consciollsness reveals it. 22 
Having established to his satisfaction the priority of being to being-known. 
Sartre now turns to his major concern in Bein[.t and Nothingness, namely, the 
pursuit of the meaning of being. A search for an allthentic self now assumes a real 
value. But in the pursuit of the discovery of this authentic self we must be aware 
of Sartrc's frame of reference and the relations between "two absolutely sepa-
rated regions of being: the being of the pre-reflectù'e cogito and the being of the 
phenomenon. "23 This duality of being can be reduced to human consciousness 
and everything which is outside of human consciousness: being~for-itself (human 
reality, consciousness, nothingness, freedom-the terms are ail synonymous) and 
heing-in-itsdf. 
20. Ibid .. p. 1 xxiii. 
21. Cf. Wilfrid Desan. The Tm.f!ic Finale: .. An Essay on the Philosophy of lean·Paul Sartre." (New 
York. 1%0). p. 10, footnote 113. 
22. Cf. Sein" and Nolhin"l/css, p. Ixxiv. 
23. lhid .. p. Ixxvi. 
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Sartre defines the for-itself as "being what it is not and not being what it 
is, "24 and states that the for-itself is in contradiction to the in-itself. The for-itself, 
as Sartre's definition suggests, discovers itself by mode of negation. This makes it 
necessary to first examine the in-itself. Sartre accomplishes this by emphasizing 
three propositions concerning the in-itself: (a) being is what it is: (b) being is in 
itself: (c) being is. 
(a) Being is !t'hat if is. 
In this first proposition Sartre rejects the common prejudice of 
"creationism." There is no creation 'ex nihilo' for if being is conceived in a 
subjectivity, it would remain only a mode of subjectivity. Such a position wou Id 
throw us back into idealism. And even if one posits a fulguration in the Leibnizian 
sense (a springing forth of the Divine Ideas into reality with God's permission)25 
being would stand opposed to the creator. "Ifbeing exists over against God, it is 
its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. "26 Being is 
inexplicable in terms of creation. 
(b) Being is in itsdf. 
By this Sartre means that since being is what it is, it is full of itself. It does not 
refer to itself as the for-itself or consciousness does-it is beyond self and opaque 
to itselfbecause it is itself. "It is solid (massif)."27 It has no 'within' opposed to a 
'without'. Therefore, "it does not enter into any connection with what is not 
itself. "28 It exhausts itself in being. It is full positivity. As a result, it has no 
potency since it cannot bec orne what it is not. 
Cc) Being is 
Since there is no potency in the in-itself, ail we can say of it is that the in-itself 
is. "lt can neither be derived from the possible nor reduced 10 the necessary. "29 It 
cannot be reduced to the necessary because necessity concerns only the relations 
of deductions between ideal propositions. Necessity does not concern existents. 
(Since being in-itself escapes necessity, Sartre calls this the 'contingency' of 
being-in-itself). Neither can the in-itself be derived from 'the possible' because 
'the possible' is a structure of human consciousness (of the for-itself) and so the 
possible is entirely outside of the domain of the in-itself. 
Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another 
being, being-in-itself is de trop for eternity. 30 
24. Ibid., p. Ixxviii. 
25. Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. "Monadology", The Monad%gy and Other l'hi/osophica/ Writ-
tings, tr. Robert Latta (London, 1968), n. 47, pp. 243-4. 
26. Being lInd Nothingness. p. \xxvii. Elsewhere (cf. Existentia/ism, pp. 16-18), Sartre proposes that 
the foundation for clinging to the 'creation' prejudice lies in transposing on God the technical view 
of the world and man's activity in the fabrication of tools. 
27. Ibid., p. 1 xxviii. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., p. 1 xxix. 
30. Ibid. Being-in·itselfis slIpert1l1olls (de trop), is an anthropomorphic expression of consciollsness. 
That being-in-itself be like this for eternity is becallse, as we shall see later, temporality belongs 
to consciollsness. 
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Faced with these two distinct domains of being, the crucial problem of BeÎng 
and Nothingness is to establish the connection between them, to discover "man 
within the world in that specifie union of man with the world"31 which constitutes 
the authentic self. Sartre asserts that two interdependent questions come immedia-
tely to the foreground: a) "What is the synthetic relation which we cali being-in-the 
world?" and b) "What must man and the world be in order for a relation between 
them to be possible?"32 It is in order to provide that answer that Sartre now 
ondertakes his massive analysis of human conduct. 
II 
Sartre begins this analysis with a concrete human activity, selecting as his 
starting point the activity of asking the above questions. Man asks questions. Now 
every question presupposes a being who questions as weil as a being which is 
questioned (about something). We stand before a being. whether it be a carburetor 
or a person, which we are questioning. Further, in asking a question, there is an 
element of expectation. We expect a reply: either 'yesO or 'no'. And in spite of 
whichever answer is given. there a!ways remains, in principle, the possibility of a 
negative answer. The questioner does not know whether the answer will be affir-
mative or negative. From these observations Sartre concludes that the question is 
a bridge between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in him who questions, 
and the possibility of non-being of being in the transcendent being questioned. 
And any affirmative answer provides a third non-being. namely, the non-being of 
limitation; for if we can reply of being 'it is thus and not otherwise', then 
whatever being is, it will allow of this formulation: "Being is that and outside 
of that nothing.' '33 
At the very outset of the inquiry, therefore, non-being as a new component of 
the real makes its appearance. And the state of this non-being is of utmost impor-
tance. Is its appearance due to psychic operations of judgment, or does this 
non-being appear because it is real? This problem is somewhat akin to the earlier 
one of the phenomenon of being and the being of the phenomenon. To resolve the 
problem Sartre must consider the being of negation which results from 'the ques-
tion' as human activity or attitude. He formulates the problem as follows: 
is negation as the structure of the judicative proposition at the origin of 
nothingness? Or on the contrary is nothingness as the structure of the real, 
the origin and foundation of negation?34 
Sartre observes that non-being has made its appearance within the limits of a 
human expectation involved in 'the question'. But because it makes its appear-
ance through consciousness. this does not me an that non-being is merely a quality 
of judgment. While it is true that a question is asked by one who judges, to 
question is not the same as to judge-it is a pre-judicative attitude. If. in our 
question, prior to any judgment, we have an expectation of a disclosure of a being, 
31. Ihid., p. 4. 
32. Ihid. 
33. Ihid .. p. 6. 
34. Ihid., p. 8. 
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we are also prepared for the eventuality of a disclosure of a non-being. Conse-
quently, non-being cannot sim ply be a result of judgment: there already exists a 
pre-judicative comprehension of non-being. 
'The question' is not the only pre-judicative conduct which Sartre sees as 
revealing non-being to us. 'Destruction' is another example. ln order for destruc-
tion, as such, to exist there must be a relation of man to being. In the disorganiza-
tion of destruction man must grasp a being as destructive, as fragile. And if this 
being is fragile it carries in its being a possibility of non-being. Therefore, the 
condition of destruction, as destruction, is a human condition and it is man who 
destroys (either directly or through sorne natural agency-such as a cyclone). 'De-
struction' , then, as weil as 'the question', supposes a pre-judicative comprehen-
sion of nothingness. And although destruction, as such, cornes into being through 
man, it is an objective fact- that is, there is a transphenomenality of non-being. 
The analysis of 'destruction', therefore, provides us with the same result as that of 
'the question'. 
Sm1re's third analysis, that ofnegativejudgment, confirms the conclusions of 
his two previous ones. Non-being does not come to things through negative judg-
ment. On the contrary, the judgment (of what Sartre calls négatités)35 is con-
ditioned and supported by non-being. Negative judgment, in a sense, is a positive 
recognition or acknowledgement of non-being. Judgment "Iimits itself to deter-
mining a prior revelation. "36 It does not cause non-being to appear. Hence, nega-
tion does not result from a function of negativity: 
the necessary condition for our saying not is that non-being be a perpetuai 
presence in us and outside of us, that nothingness haunt being. 37 
Where, then, does nothingness come from? 
Since non-being is grasped in a pre-judicative comprehension, in the three 
modes outlined above, nothingness must be at the heart of being. Nothingness 
could not jerive ils nihilating force from itself because nothingness is nihilated 
(being which is denied). "Nothingness is not. "3S Therefore, Sartre concludes, it is 
only being which can nihilate itself. Yet, the being by which nothingness cornes to 
the world cannot be being-in-itself since being-in-itself has already been revealed 
as full positivity-and this excludes nothingness. 
Since that being which is full positivity cannot create nothingness outside of 
itself, "the Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world must nihilate Noth-
ingness in its Being ... in COllnection ~vith its own being. "39 This Being is the 
For-itself which is its own Nothingness. 
Sartre asks us to notice that if we return to the attitude of 'the question', we 
can rcadily see that the questioner must have the possibility of dissociating him-
35. There is no english equivalent 10 this word coined hy Sartre. What he means by the term seems 
to be whatever is experienced whose inner structure necessitates negation. 
36. Ibid., p. 10. 
37. Ibid .. pp. 13-14. 
38. Ibid .. p. 27. 
39. Ibid. 
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self from the causal order of being which produccs only being. In withdrawing 
himself from being the questioner escapes the causal order (determinism) of the 
world. He effects a double nihilation: he nihilates the thing questioned in relation 
to himself and he nihilates himself in relation to the thing questioned in order to 
bring out of himself the possibility of non-being. This disengagement is a human 
process. Man is the being through whom nothingness cornes ta the world. If man 
is able to make inquiry, to assume the attitude of 'the question', his being must be 
such that he can put himself outside oI being, su ch that he is not subject to it. 
This being of man, this placing of himself 'outside of' being and the causal 
order of the world (determinism), isIr{'{'dom. But such freedom is not a property 
of the essence of man: 
human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence 
of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we cali freedom is 
impossible to distinguish from the hein? of 'human reality'.40 
Hence, nothingness, in separating man from the causal order, also separates 
his present from his future and from his past. 41 Human reality experiences itself as 
nihilation of its past being and it must be conscious of this separation as a struc-
ture of consciousness. 
Freedom (Nothingness) is the being of consciousness. Therefore, conscious-
ness ought to exist as consciousness offreedom. In freedom, man is his past and is 
his future in the Iorm of nihilatioll. This is what is involved when Sartre says that 
the consciousness of freedom is revealed to man in an/{uish: 
anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in 
anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself.42 
Anguish is the revelation of ourselves to ourselves as nothingness and as 
possibility. Since we are 'outside of' the world we are 11l1determincd. In anguish 
we discover that nothingness separates us from our essence, from ourselves-it 
separates us from our past and it separates us from our future because the pas! and 
the future arc not. Why consciousness of our freedom is revealed to us in anguish 
is because anguish is the revelation to us of our conduct. our being, as pos.I'ihility 
and as our possibility, undetermined, bound or constrained by nothing. 43 Since 
our existence precedes essence 
40. Ibid., p. 30. 
41. Cf. Ibid., p. 34. 
42. Ibid .. p. 35. 
43. If freedom is the structure of human consciousness. such that man is freedom. and this freedom 
is revealed to me in anguish, then why am 1 not perpetually in a state of anguish? Sartre's answer 
to this problem significantly renders his conclusions more acceptable in terms of common ex-
perience. Anguish is exceptional and the reason why this is so is because in ordinary everyday 
life we are engaged in the world. "Our being is immediately 'in situation' ". (Ibid .. p. 47). Our 
normal expectations of the real derive their meaning from an original possibility of myself 
projected as my choiee of myself in the world. Anguish appcars only when 1 disengage myself 
from the world in which 1 engaged myself. In This 'iense, angllish OCClIfS whcn 1 çail baçk into 
question my project of myself in the world through which the world had assumed meaning and 
value. This is why in anguish. besides having my tot,ù freedom appear to me. 1 am t~!ced with the 
faet of "not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself." (Ibid .. 
p.48). 
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there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human 
nature. In other words. there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. 
On the other hand, if God do es not exist, we find no values or commands to 
turn to to justify our conduct. So in the bright realm of values, we have no 
excuse behind us, nor justification before us. We are alone, with no 
excuses. 44 
Although "we are alone, with no excuses" This does not mean that we do not 
look for excuses. Face to face with our nothingness in anguish, our reflective 
defence against it is one of flight. "Everything takes place, in fact, as if our 
essential and immediate behavior with respect to anguish is flight. "45 lt is this 
attitude of excuse which underlies the theoretical conception of psychological 
determinism. ln our flight to excuse we try to make our essence a mode ofbeing of 
the in-itselfby attempting to apprehend ourse Ives from without as "an Other or as 
a thing. "46 
This flight from our freedom, this attempt to apprehend ourselves as "an 
Other' , or as "a thing" in order to have an excuse for our conduct is what Sartre 
caUs "badfaith" .47 Instead ofturning its negation outward, consciousness directs 
its negation toward itself and takes a negative attitude toward itself, thus denying 
what it is. Human reality, as we saw earlier, must be what it is not and not be what 
it is. This is the structure of the pre-reflective cogito. True authenticity of self 
requires the capacity to place these elements of being and non-being in 
synthesis. 48 But 'bad faith' is self-deception. In 'bad faith' man attempts to view 
his being and his non-being as duality, and this introduces duplicity. 
The basic concept. .. utilizes the double property of the human being, who is 
at once afacticity and a transcende nec. These two aspects of human reality 
are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not 
wish eithcr to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith 
seeks to aftïrm their identity while preserving their differences .49 
Bad faith is accomplishcd by means of a vacillation between facticity (what 
we are) and transcendence (what we are not) such that we seek to reduce our 
transcendence to facticity, to reduce the for-itself to the in-itself, and thereby 
44. Existentialism. p. 27. 
45. Beinl? and NOlhingness. p. 48. 
46. Ibid .• p. 52. "The chosen possible we do not wish to see sustained in being by a pure nihilating 
freedom. so we attempt to apprehend it as engendered by an object already constituted. which is 
no other than our self. envisaged and described as if it were another person." Ibid .• p. 52. 
47. It is a type of lie but it is the same person who is both deceiver and deceived. To deceive 
presupposes a knowledge of the truth which 1 hide and to be deceived 1 must accept as true that 
of which 1 am ignorant. In a project of bad faith 1 must know as deceiver what is hidden from me 
as the deceived. And this must take place Ilot in two different moments in time but in the unitary 
structure of the same project. Cf .• Francis Jeanson. Le Problème Moral el La Pensée de Sartre 
(Paris. 1965). p. 171. 
48. Both authenticity and 'bad faith' attempt to unite the duality of being and non-being in the 
subject. The ditTerence between them seems to be that in authenticity the duality is preserved in 
a synthesis whereas in 'bad faith' the aim is the exploitation of the opposites in order to establish 
that '1 am not what 1 am'. We çould not have a project of freedom if we cou Id not have a project 
of bad faith. 
49. Ibid., p. 68. 
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deny our complete responsibility for our facticity and hide our absolute freedom 
from ourselves. There are two basic ways in which this can be done: we can 
conceive of our transcendence as ifil were our facticity or, on the other hand, we 
can conceive of our facticity as if il were our transcendence. 
When we try ta tlee from our facticity (what we are) ta our transccndence 
(what we are not) and make this is-notness our being (facticity), we adopt one 
attitude of '1 am not what 1 am'. We try ta deny responsibility for our choices 
which make LIS ta be what we are. We tlee from what we are ta what we are not 
and pretend that this what we are not is the real LIS; that is. we treat our transcen-
dence as if il were our facticity. But our acts which constitute us (our facticity 
which we are trying ta tlee) depend upon our project-oLlr transcendence. Hence. 
in this project of bad faith, in this false gesture which we make, we are simply 
trying to hide what we are from ourselves. trying ta deny our freedom and our 
responsibility for our facticity. But Sartre would say that we are still caught up in 
responsibility for our facticity even in denying it; the project of bad faith by which 
we deny our responsibility is still a project. We are entirely free and wholly 
responsible for the attempt ta hi de ourselves from ourselves. 
The second mode of bad faith is the flight from our transcendence ta our 
facticity through the denial of our transcendence and of the responsibility and the 
freedom which gave rise to our facticity. In this mode of flight we attempt to deny 
that in our transcendence we are always more than that we are in any given 
moment. But our facticity at any given moment depends upon our transcendence. 
lt is because we do not want ta be more or other than what we are in the factual 
situation that we deny our transcendence. But this approach is also self-defeating 
because our denial can only be done in the light of a transcendence (which is what 
we are attempting to deny.) Hence, a cri tic al examination of this second mode of 
bad faith still reveals ta us our freedom and complete responsibility. We cannot 
escape from il. 
In bath cases of bad faith we use our pure possibility or transcendence as an 
excuse, a flight from anguish. because we attempt to reduce it ta a facticity which 
would then allow us to plead determinism. But any critical analysis of bad faith 
reveals a project and sa gives evidence of our pure freedom and absolute respon-
sibility. The denial of our transcendence reveals ta us our transcendence. It is 
only pure freedom which can deny freedom. 
III 
Tuming from the examina tian of the problem of nothingness and the insights 
fumished by it, Sartre can now proceed ta a description of the structures of the 
for-itself. 
(a) The For-itself as Presence (0 Self 
If consciousness is the requisite condition for the possibility ofbad faith, then 
the for-itself must be a completely different kind of being than the in-itself. The 
in-itself is; the for-itself can at1empt ta escape from itself. What it means for 
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consciousness to be what it is not and not to be what it is, is that it escapes from 
the unit y of identity of the in-itself. The for-itself is a duality which is unit y . "The 
law of being of thefar-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to 
be itself in the form of presence to itself.' '50 For a 'self' to exist, its unit y of being 
must include its own nothingness as the negation of identity. As a result, "it is the 
obligation of the for-itself ... to exist as a being which perpetually effects in itself 
a break in being. "51 Its 'hole' or break in being is its nothingness or the continuai 
putting into question of being by being. 
(b) The Facticity of the For-itself 
Yet the for-itself is. It is in so far as it is thrown into the world and abandoned 
in a 'situation'. The for-itself is something of which it is not the foundation 
-namely, its presence ta the world. 52 This presence to the world is anterior to 
any nihilating activity by which the for-itself bec ornes presence to self. Hence, 
"we appear to ourselves as having the character of an un justifiable fact. "53 In this 
condition of contingent fact, the for-itself is reattached with being-in-itself. Thus 
the for-itself 
is sustained by a perpetuai contingency for which it assumes the responsibil-
ity and which it assimilates without ever being able to supress il. 54 
The gratuitous unjustifiable contingency at the foundation of the for-itself by 
which consciousness experiences itself as de trop, produces the feeling of nausea, 
just as the consciousness of nothingness produces anguish. 55 
(c) The for-itself as Lack and the Being of Value 
In its facticity, in so far as it is, the for-itself as presence to the world is not the 
foundation of its being. As presence to self the for-itself, escaping the unit y of 
identity, is the foundation of its nothingness. But the for-itself cannot prodllce 
nihilation without determining itself as a lack of heing. It can determine its being 
only against the in-itself as not being that q{ which it is consciolls. In this respect, 
the for-itself is the fOllndation of itself as lack of being, and lack appears in the 
world only with the upsurge of hllman reality.56 
'Desire' confirms Sartre's argument. Any being which is what it is would be 
incapable of desire. Desire must be an escape from itself towards the object 
desired. "Desire is a lack ofbeing ... " and since "human reality is Jack, then it is 
through human reality that the trinity of the existing, the lacking, and the lacked 
cornes into being. "57 
50. Ibid., p. 94. 
51. Ibid., p. 96. 
52. Cf. Ibid., p. 97. 
53. Ibid., p. 98. 
54. Ibid., p. lOI. 
55. Cf. Jeanson, Le Problème Moral et La Pensée de Sartre, p. 187. 
56. Cf. Being and Nothingness. p. 106. 
57. Ibid .. p. 107. 
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That which is desired, what human reality seeks, is itself as a totality, as a 
unit y . ln its being the for-itself is a faillire because it is the foundation only of itself 
as nothingness: hut this has meaning "only if the for-itself apprehends itself as 
failure in the presence (~fthe heing which it has failed to be . , . which would be its 
fOllndation with itself. "58 Here, then, is the origin of transcendence-human real-
ity surpassing itselftoward what it lacks. This totality, both lacked and desired. is 
the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself: 
it would be its own foundation not as nothingness hut as heing and would 
preserve within it the necessary translucency of consciousness along with the 
coincidence with itself of heing-in-itself. But this return to self would be 
without distance; it would not be presence to itself but identity with itself. In 
short, this being would be exactly the self. 59 
This totality, as Sartre points outs, is impossible to achieve, Human reality 
could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itseIf. But although it can 
never be realized. consciousness can exist only as engaged in its pursuit. "I! is 
absolute transcendence in absolute immanence. "60 It is one with consciousness, 
This totality which is the being of the self is value, The being of value is to be 
value: that is, not to be being. The self, totality, and value are one since "the 
being of value qua value is the being of what does not have being. "61 But value 
still depends upon consciousness. "Human reality is that by which value arrives 
in the world."62 Value is that which is lacked; it is the missing totality towards 
which the being makes itself be. This is the sense in which "value haunts 
freedom"63 Value is not positcd by the for-itself, it is one with the for-itself, one 
with consciousness, one with nothingness. Value is lived as the meaning of lack 
and desire which constitutes my present being. Therefore, the cogito, reflective 
consciousness, is also moral consciousness since it cannot arise without disclos-
ing values. 64 
(d) The For-Itsdf and the Being (if Possibilities 
We have seen that what the for-itself lacks and desires is coincidence with 
itself. The transcendent relation of the for-itself toward its totality, toward the 
self, is a project of identification or unification of the for-itself which is not what it 
is with an absent for-itself which it is and which it both lacks and desires. What is 
lacking to the for-itself is the possibility of the for-itself. "Thus the for-itself 
cannot appear without being haunted by value and projected toward its own 
possibles. ' '65 
Now what is involved in 'the possible' is a sort of paradox: on the one hand, 
'the possible' is prior to the being of which it is the possibility: on the other hand, 
58. Ibid .. p. 109. 
59. Ibid .. p. 110. 
60. Ibid .• p. III. 
61. Ibid., p. 1i3. 
62. Ibid .. p. 114. 
63. Ibid .. p. IlS. 
64. Cf. Ibid., p. 116. 
65. Ibid .. p. 117. 
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'the possible'. as possible, must be in some way such that being is prior to 
possibility, But Sartre finds the paradox of 'the possible' proportioned to the 
paradox of human reality. The possible is a property of a particular being for 
which it is a power as a structure of being surpassing itself in a transcendence. 66 
There is no way that the possible can be seen as Aristotelian potency. as belong-
ing to the domain of the in-itself. The in-itself is what it is in the plenitude of its 
identity: 
... the possible comes into the world through human reality ... Just as 
there can be lack in the world only if it comes to the world through a being 
which is its own lack, so there can be possibiIity in the world only if it comes 
through a being which is for itself its own possibility.67 
'The possible' is the absent for-itself which the for-itself lacks and desires as 
value in order to attempt to constitute the self. In this way the concrete possible 
haunts the lacking for-itself such that if the desire for the lacked for-itself could be 
realized or satisfied it would confer on the lacking for-itself being-in-itself. For 
human reality, the possible is precisely the something which the for-itself lacks in 
order to be itself. 
(e) The For-itself and Temporality 
In its negating conduct the for-itself. precisely because it is for-itself, is a 
transcendence toward its possibles. This can only happen within a temporal sur-
passing. If the meaning of its transcendence is its temporarily we can only under-
stand the transcendence of the for-itself in seeing its relation to time. 
i-the pa st 
The past has meaning only with respect to the present. The past appears from 
our present actuality as our past- that is. as present which we have heen. It is a 
transcendence behind our present. This is how the past is linked to the present 
and the only way in which it can have meaning. "The past indeed can haunt the 
present but it cannot he the present; it is the present which is the past" .68 Only the 
for-itself can have a past ("be" its own past) and has to he its past because it puts 
its past being into question. 11 is our present which sustains our past in being and 
this is why we are responsible for our past-we keep it in being. The past is, in this 
sense, the ever-growing in-itself that we are. At the moment of death we become a 
pure in-itself because we slip completely into the past. In so far as we have to be 
our past we are without the possibility of not being it. The past is our essence. It is 
our in-itself. lt is our facticity. 
We are our past: but until the moment of death we are not this in-itself in the 
mode of identity. Because of nihilation we are not our past because we are related 
to our being in the mode of not-being. "Thus it is in so far as 1 am my past that 1 
can not-be il. "69 The past is the in-itself which we are as surpassed. And although 
66. Cf. Ibid .• p. 119. 
67. Ibid .. p. 120. 
68. Ibid., p. 136. 
69. Ibid., p. 142. 
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the pa st lives on and haunts the for-itself as our contingency, our nihilating activ-
ity keeps a gulf between our past and present. 
ii-the present 
The past is in-itselL The present is for-itselL The fundamental meaning of 
present is presence to, "The Present, therefore, can be only the presence of the 
For-itselfto being-in-itself. , . The For-itselfis defined as presence to being."70 In 
this sense the for-itself is the being by which the present enters the world. First, it 
is a witness to being. But it can only be a witness if it is no! that to which it is 
witness, to which it is presence. The present, therefore, is the for-itselfs non-
being making itself presence to being. The first relation of the for-itself to being-
in-itself is negation-it reveals itself as not being being-in-itself, but at a distance. 
It is present to being in the form of flight. Therefore, the Present is not because the 
for-itself negates and flees the in-itself to which it is present. "The Present is not; 
it makes itself present in the form of flight. "71 
iii-the fl/ture 
The flight of the for-itself to the for-itself lacked (which is the self) is the 
future. The for-itself (present) is not what it is (past) and is what it is not (future). 
The for-itself is its own future. "There is a Future because the For-itself has to he 
its being instead of simply being iL"72 Because through negation the for-itself has 
to be a being beyond being, the determining being of the for-Ïtself is the Future or, 
in other words, its own possibility. "Determinism appears on the ground of the 
futurizing project of myself. "73 It is the future which constitutes the meaning of 
the present for-itself without pre-determining that being. The future is the possibil-
ity of our being beyond being but it is never realized because of the constant 
perspective of the possibility of not-being it: 
the For-itself can never be its future except problematically, for it is sepa-
rated from it by a Nothingness which it is. In short the For-itself is free, and 
its Freedom is to itselfits own limit. To be free is to be condemned to be free. 
Thus the Future qua Future does not have to be. 74 
Hence anguish springs from our not being sufficiently that transcendence 
which gives meaning to our present. The future is the continuai possibilization of 
our possibles. 
(f) The For-itsel! and Transcendence 
Transcendence is "that inner and realizing negation which reveals the in-
itself while determining the being of the for-itself.' '75 What truly characterizes the 
for-itself as for-itself is its transcendence. But its transcendence is its is-notness, 
its project, its desire, its possibility. 
70. Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
71. Ibid., p. 149. 
72. Ibid., p. 152. 
73. Ibid., p. 154. 
74. Ihid., p. 156. 
75. Ihid., p. 219. 
75 
GERARD T. CAMPBELL 
ln order to be, the in-itself needs only itself. The for-itself, on the other hand, 
can exist only in the unit y ofits ekstases (Iiterally, what stands out from il.) ln this 
way, in its transcendence, it stands in continuai need of the foundation of the 
in-itself whereupon, through negation, it can produce itself. One example of this 
relation between the for-itself and the in-itself whereby the for-itself produces 
itself is knowledge. Ali knowledge is intuitive knowledge. 76 "lntuition is the pres-
ence of consciousness to the thing."77 But presence, as we have seen, supposes 
distance and negation. What is present to us is not us. Every theory of knowledge 
presupposes this "non-being." Ali presence to something excites or triggers this 
not-being in us of that which is present. As a result of these considerations Sartre 
defines the for-itself as follows: 
the for-itself is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as 
this being is essentially a certain way of not being a being which it posits 
simultaneously as other th an itself. 7X 
As the being which we are not melts into and represents the absolute 
plenitude of the in-itself so are we, as for-itself, in our nothingness, the not-being 
which determines itself from the foundation of this fullness. The fullness of our 
freedom is grounded in the fullness of the in-itself through which we determine 
ourselves by negation. 
But this inner negation is also realization. The project toward self on the part 
of the for-itself to the for-itself lacked is based upon that which is lacked. And 
what is lacked (and, hence, desired and valued) is precisely that to which we are 
present and which we are not. Therefore, as soon as something is revealed to us it 
is revealed as an instrument-thing, as a tha! toward which correlative to a possibil-
ity. While the in-itself shows us what we are not it is at the sa me time a de ter-
minism of our lack which then appears in projection as our lacked for-itself. As 
long as the for-itself is for-itself it is condemned to be free: 
picture an ass drawing behind him a cart. He attempts to get hold of a carrot 
which has been fastened to the end of a stick which in turn has been tied to 
the shaft of the cart. Every effort on the part of the ass to sieze the carrot 
results in advancing the whole apparatus and the cart itself, which always 
remains at the sa me distance from the ass. Thus we run after a possible 
which our very running causes to appear, which is nothing but our running it-
self, and which thereby is by definition out ofreach. We run toward ourselves 
and we are-due to this very fact-the being which cannot be reunited with 
itself. 79 
IV 
Being-For-Others 
We have already seen that it is through us that the world has organization and 
meaning; this is accomplished by means of our possibilities and our project. The 
76. Deduction, argument, reasoning are instruments leading to intuition. 
77. Being and Nothingness, p. 210. 
78. Ibid .. p. 212. 
79. Ibid., pp. 247-248. 
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world is for us, as a presence to it, both obstacle and instrument. In the constant 
mechanics of negated facticity \eading ta transcendence and the positing of possi-
bles. there is a tluidity of movement. The ass drawing the cart and pursuing the 
carrot is an image of a perpetuaI motion machine. But it is an incomplete and 
inadequate image of human reality. Suddenly the cart. the ass and the carrot are 
Iying on the road! The ass perceives that he has been sideswiped. The Other 
makes his appearance felL Our solitude has been rudely interrupted and con-
sciousness now reveals a being which is our being without being-for-us. 
We need onl y take 'shame' as an example. "Shame is an immediate sh udder 
which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation. "80 
In shame, we are ashamed ~l what we are. We live il. We are ashamed of our-
selves before someone. ("Nobody can be vulgar ail alone!")81 We recognize that 
we are as the Other sees us. We are seen. We have become an object for the Other. 
The Other is a mediator between ourselves and us. Therefore, if we are to grasp 
ail the structures of our being we must investigate this radically different ontologi-
cal structure-our being-for-others. To accomplish this we must examine a) the 
existence of the Other and b) the relation of our being to the being of the Other. 
(a) The existence of the Other 
We cannot prove the existence of the Other. To be able to do so would 
assume the priority of knowledge to being with the result that the Other would be 
a construct of our thought-as such, the Other would have only ideal existence. 
We cannot prove his existence. We can only affirm it. 
Since we affirm the existence of the Other this affirmation can only come 
from the cogito because the Other is immediately present to us as not being us. At 
this point one of the modalities of the Other' s presence to us is as an object. 
Here, Sartre wams us, we must be very careful. If the other is only present to 
us as an object, as not being us, this would leave our pure subjectivity entirely 
intact. The interruption of our solitude wou Id remain unaccounted for; shame, for 
example, would be impossible. Nevertheless, in our consciousness of our shame 
before somebody we recognize that we are an object for a subject. It is this 
meaning which must be investigated. 
One approach that we could adopt would be to say that since we are con-
scious of the other as object, the relation is reciprocal and we can also be an object 
for another subject. But again, this procedure leads us to constitute the Other 
ideally in existence by extrapolating our own negating activities and assuming that 
they belong to another. What becomes obvious is that we can never get to the 
Other's existence as subject starting from the modality of the Other's presence to 
us as object. As long as the Other appears to us as an object, any subjectivity 
which we posit in him in order to see ourselves as object is fictive. We cannot 
enter into the immanence of another: 
80. Ibid .. p. 272. 
81. Ibid. 
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in arder for me ta be able ta appear ta myself as an abject for the Other, 1 
wou Id have ta apprehend the Other as subject; that is ta apprehend him in his 
interiority. But in sa far as the Other appears ta me as abject my objectivity 
for him cannat appear ta me.82 
Setting aside the idealistic approaches ta the subjectivity of the Other, Sartre 
tries ta find in consciousness the revelation of the Other as a 'presence in persan', 
that is, in a modality other than the knowledge which we have ofhim as an abject. 
Ta do this it is necessary ta return ta the for-itself in a situation. By situation, 
Sartre means "this ensemble in the world with its double and inverted 
determination"83 that is, that the world is thus because of our possibilities and our 
possibilities are thus because of the world. The Other, in our 'situation' is for us 
an abject. As an abject he is there, not us, present ta us in the structure of our 
world-a world organized according ta our possibilities, a world of which we are 
the centre. But suddenly we are aware that "instead of a grouping toward me of 
the objects, there is now an orientation whichfleesfrom me."84 This appearance 
of a disintegration of the abjects of our uni verse announces the appearance of the 
Other in our universe. He steals our world! He organizes it according ta his 
possibilities. But there is more. The Other is not simply the one we see (as object) 
and who sees the same abjects which we see and confers on them an absence for 
us. He looks at us. In his organization of the world we are an abject for him. 
" 'Being-seen-by-the-Other' is the truth of 'seeing-the-Other.' "85 Fixed by 'the 
look' of the Other, we are seen. He places us as an abject-an abject that we are 
without the ability ta determine what we are for him. This is the route by which 
we arrive at the existence of the Other as present subject: 
it is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that 1 
must be able ta apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. 86 
What does this being seen mean for us? 
With 'the look' of the Other we are placed. "1 am conscious of my self as 
escaping myself, not in that 1 am the foundation of my own nothingness, but in 
that 1 have my foundation outside myself.' '87 The self cornes ta exist as an abject 
in the world and we are revealed to ourselves as an in-itself for an Other. As a 
result of being looked at, we must live our facticity. We strip ourselves of our 
transcendence. By means of 'the look' of the Other our transcendence has been 
transcended. Ail of our possibilities are for the Other instruments which will serve 
him against us. We are naked, vulnerable, in danger. "1 am no longer master of 
the situatiof1."88 ln sum, our possibilities are now alienated from us and as-
sociated with abjects of the world serving the Other. 
82. Ibid., p. 297. 
83. Ibid.,p.318. 
84. Ibid., p. 312. 
85. Ibid.,p.315. 
86. Ibid., pp. 314-315. 
87. Ibid.,p.319. 
88. Ibid., p. 325. 
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There is yet another dimension to 'the look' of Others. "What is certain is 
that 1 am looked at: what is only probable is that 'the look' is bound to this or that 
intra-mundane presence. "89 What is important is that we cannot always identify 
'the look' as originating from a particular source who is present to us as object and 
who subsequently objectifies us. In our world we can never get to the Other as 
subject-but only as an object-through his body, On the other hand. we are led 
to the existence of the Other as subject from the fact that our being is alienated 
from us and that we are conscious that our transcendence can be transcended in 
our situation. Therefore. the Other is not necessarily this Other. The multiplicity 
of Others is not a collection but a totalit)' "sinee each Otherfinds his bein!i in the 
Other. "90 In short. the Other is always present to us in so far as we are always 
for-Others. The proof of this condition 
1 realize concretely on the occasion of the upsurge of an object into m)' 
universe if'this object indicates to me that 1 am probably an object at present 
functioning as a d!fferentiated this for a consciousness ... Each look makes 
us prove concretely-and in the indubitable certainty of the (,o!iito-that we 
exist for ail living men. 91 
(b) the relation (~{ our being to the being q{ the Other 
With the theft of our world by the Other. with our transcendence transcended 
by him such that our being is alienated from us and we exist for-the-Other and 
must live this situation, what happens or must happen to our for-itself? Must we 
remain vulnerable and naked? 
The answer to this problem has been there ail along: to put on clothes is to 
hide one's object-state; it is to claim the right of seeing without being seen; 
that is. to be pure subject.92 
Because of the shame of which we are conscious due to our exposure by the 
Other, we attempt to re-coyer ourselves. We recover ourselves by looking at the 
Other because, as we have seen. we cannot be an object for an object. We must 
grasp our alienated being and to accomplish this we must continually make the 
Other that which we have to flot be. We make the Other lose himself in the world 
by negating our being-for-the-Other and thereby reducing the Other to the status 
of object. The only way of recovering our for-itself is constantly to contain the 
Other within his objectivity for us. As a result of this attitude. "my relations with 
the Other-as-object are essentially made up of ruses designed to make him remain 
an object.' '93 The only way to keep ourselves from being exploited is to exploit 
the Other-to reduce the Other to in-itself. But in this task of objectifying the 
Other we are always doomed to failure. The whole process can explode at any 
time. In the previous relations of being-for-itself with being-in-itself. in the first 
ekslasis, negating activity was simple and revealed the for-itself to itself. The 
in-itself could not negate reciprocally. But the Other can always in turn negate 
89. Ibid .. p. 339. 
90. Ibid., p. 309. 
91. Ibid .. p. 344. 
92. Ibid., p. 354. 
93. Ibid., p. 364. 
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his-objectivity-for-us and so reconstitute us as an object. The negation of being 
for-Others is still an internaI negation. The essential point is that now the negating 
activity is divided into two internai and opposed negations: 
each is an internai negation, but they are nevertheless separated from one 
another by an inapprehensible eternal nothingness ... Simllltanl?ollsly with 
negation of myself, the Other denies concerning himself that he is me. These 
two negations are equally indispensible to being-for-others, and they cannot 
be reunited by any synthesis.94 
As we continually attempt to regain our alienated being, our being-for-itself 
which is lost by 'the look' of the Other, the Other reciprocates in order to free 
himselffrom us. While we seek to regain our freedom by enslaving the Other, the 
freedom of the Other is always trying to enslave us. "Conflict is the original 
meaning of being-for-others.' '95 
If conflict, in general, is the primary meaning of the structure of our relations 
with others, it is important to see at least one concrete instance of this conflict. To 
do so will enable us to better understand Sartre's position on absolute freedom. 
Perhaps the most practical concrete relation to examine is that of love, for surely, 
if there is a possibility to escape our absolute subjectivity in unit y with the Other. 
this would seem to be by love. 
lt has already been noted that the Other places us in constant danger by 'the 
look' and thereby steals our freedom and our project of attaining the self. In the 
world of the Other, we become an instrument for him since he possesses us. He 
sees us as we can never see ourselves; we do not know what we are for him since 
we can never enter into his subjectivity. We recover ourselves by supressing the 
freedom of the Other and constituting him as object (which stillleaves his nature 
intact). In short, "everything which may be said of me in my relation with the 
Other applies to him as weIl. "96 
Now in the quest for unification by love, whether we address ourselves to the 
Other in so far as we are an object or in so far as he is an object. the intention is the 
same: "1 want to assimilate the Other as the Other-Iooking-at-me. "97 We place 
ourselves at the centre of the world in an attempt to seduce the Other and act upon 
the Other's freedom such that we will have an assurance policy against his theft of 
our freedom. We want to exist for him in such a way that he will exist for us as his 
project: 
My project of recovering my being can be realized only if 1 get hold of this 
Other's freedom and reduce it to being a freedom subject to my freedom. 98 
In our attempt to seduce the Other we want the Other to choose us. "The 
lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a thing ... He wants 
94. Ibid .. pp. 366-368. 
95. Ibid., p. 445. 
96. Ibid. 
97. Ibid., p. 446. 
98. Ibid .. p. 447. 
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to possess a freedom as freedom."99 As lover, therefore, what we really seek is to 
be freely loved. We want the Other's free choice to be us as the objective limit of 
his freedom such that we should be "the unique and privileged occasion of il." 100 
We want the Other to choose us as an absolute, as a supreme value, su ch that we 
are no longer un justifiable and de trop, but rather that we are the world for the 
Other. 
But alas! Love is a deception. Our project of making ourselves loved is 
doomed to failure. It reprovokes conflict rather than overcoming it. "If the be-
loved can love us, he is wholly ready to be assimilated by our freedom."lOl If we 
provoke love in the Other the sense of his love is also 'to be loved.' We are no 
longer his absolute value since he throws us back into our own subjectivity by 
trying to make us love him. 
Each one wants the other to love him but does 
not take into account the fact that to love is to want to be loved and that thlls 
by wanting the other to love him, he only wants the other to want to he loved 
in tllrn. 102 
We cannot achieve unit y with the Other throllgh love. He continllally refers 
us back to our own un jus titi able subjectivity. We cannot escape ourselves. We are 
condemned to be free. 
v 
7Ï1e Structure (~l Ahso/ute Freedom 
Since there is no escape from our freedom or subjectivity either in our rela-
tions to others or in our relations to the in-itself. the tinal task remaining is to show 
the ramifications of the ahsolllte character of freedom as the tirst condition of 
action. In order to understand the dimensions of freedom Sartre now analyzes the 
structures of action. 
The first important aspect of action is that it is intentiona/: "to act is to 
modify the shape of the world; it is to arrange means in view of an end." 103 Action 
is not mere movement: to act, in short, means to intentionally realize a cons cio us 
project. Hence, the necessary condition of acting intentionally is to recognize an 
objective lack and, in the light of this recognition, 10 posit a desideratu/11, a 
yet-unrealized possible: 
This means that from the moment of the tirst conception of the aet, con-
sciousness has been able to withdraw itselffrom the full world of which it is 
consciousncss and to leave the level of being in order frankly to approach that 
of non-being. 104 
99. Ihid .. p. 448. Sartre's concept of love corresponds to the role of Johannes. the seducer. Cf. 
Spren Kierkegaard. "Diary of the Seducer", EitherlOr (New York. 1959), Vlliume 1. 
100. Ibid .. p. 449. 
J(lJ. Ihid .. p. 454. 
102. Ibid .. p. 459. 
103. INd., p. 529. 
104. lhid., p. 530. 
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For action to take place, therefore, there must be not merely recognition or 
presence of the for-itself to the in-itself. but also a perception of the' for-itself as 
lack (producing value) and, finally, the for-itself as projecting itself toward self, 
that is, creating motivation entirely from itself. Since the for-itself creates its own 
motive or self-movement, "we must recognize that the indispensable and funda-
mental condition of ail action is the freedom of the acting being."105 
Now whereas "it is in fact impossible to find an act without a motive" 106 this 
in no way implies that the motive causes the act in any determined way. Sartre 
stresses that the motive itself is a free creation, an integral part of the act itself and 
in no way prior to il. lt is the for-itself which confers on the motive its value as 
cause. An act always escapes a determining cause because the intention of the act 
arises from our transcendence, from our project (which is an ensemble of non-
existents). Since the project and the act coincide, "the motive, the act, and the 
end are ail constituted in a single upsurge ... It is the act which desires its ends 
and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom. "107 
Freedom, then, is the very stuff of our being. It is not a quality or a property 
of the for-itself. It is the for-itself. It cannot be defined or referred to a concept (for 
then it would not be free). Existence and freedom precede essence. Since the 
for-itself always has to be, "1 am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, 
beyond the causes and the motives of my act. .. This means that no limits to my 
freedom can be found except freedom itself." 108 
We cannot hide this freedom from ourselves. The determinist attempts to do 
so by trying to apprehend the for-itself as being-in-itself, to pretend that there is a 
nature or an essence to the for-itself-but even this enterprise of explanation is to 
be seen as a free project. [t is precisely because we are presence to ourselves that 
we can attempt these escapes, but the very attempt reveals our freedom to us. The 
attitude of bad faith is always upset by anguish. 
Nor can we pretend to be simultaneously free and determined. The corn mon 
tendency is to give man a determinate nature and then allow him freedom with 
respect to voluntary acts while restricting determinism to the domain of the pas-
sions. Su ch psychological manichaeism must be rejected, Sartre claims, because 
it introduces a dichotomy into the human psyche: 
indeed it is impossible for a determined process to act upon a spontaneity, 
exactly as it is impossible for objects to act upon consciousness. Thus any 
synthesis of two types of existents is impossible; they are not homogeneous; 
they will remain each one in its incommunicable solitude. 109 
Decartes had already tried a dualist approach with a noted lack of success. 
Sartre insists that we can profit from the errors of Descartes. Only two solutions 
105. Ibid .. p. 533. 
106. Ibid .. p. 535. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Ibid .. p. 537. 
109. Ibid., p. 540. 
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are possible: "either man is wholly determined ... or else man i s wholly free." 110 
Since the very proposition that he is wholly determined is self-defeating (and 
'anguish' makes us recognize it), Sartre would have us conclude that man is 
wholly free and then try to understand what absolute freedom involves. 
For Sartre, the first consequence of man being wholly free is that the volun-
tary act can no longer be considered the unique structure offree acts. Since man is 
free ail of his acts are free. Since man is a unit y "how can we refuse autonomy to 
the passions in order to grant it to the will?" III Even for the will to constitute itself 
as will supposes an original freedom. Consequently, and as a result of his investi-
gation of deliberation, Sartre concludes that the will is merely a reflective mode of 
being in relation to posited ends. But "passion can posit the same ends."112 For 
example, in the face of danger we can will to resist and to confront the danger or, 
in an emotional reaction, we can run away in fear. Whichever attitude we adopt. 
he says, the difference lies in the subjective attitude to the end posited: 
the difference here depends on the choice of means and on the degree of 
reflection and of making explicit, not on the end. Yet the one who tlees is said 
to be "passionate", and we reserve the term "voluntary" for the man who 
resists. 113 
To be free, therefore, means that our ends are not dictated to us by a nature 
or from sorne outside force. Our ends must be subjective. We alone choose them. 
lt is precisely this choice which characterizes our being in its upsurge offreedom. 
Since both volition and the passions are subjective attitudes, both are free: 
thus since freedom is identical with my existence, it is the foundation of ends 
which 1 shall attempt to attain either by the will or by passionate efforts. 
Therefore it cannot be limited to voluntary acts. 114 
Freedom, then, coincides with the very being of the for-itself, with the noth-
ingness which the for-Îtself has to be. Since the for-itself, as presence, is al ways 
at a distance from itself, it cannot be determined by its past, neither can it be 
determined by anything external to consciousness nor, finally. can it be deter-
mined by ends or motives since, as transcendence, the for-itself is a being which is 
originally a project and creates its own ends and motives in its free upsurge toward 
self. Nevertheless, even if our acts cannot be defined in terms of the state of the 
world or in terms of our past, this does not mean that our acts are capricious or 
gratuitous in the sense that they are unintelligible. Choice means more than the 
mere capacity to choose oneself according to whim. "A choice is said to be free if 
it is su ch that it could have been other than what it is." 115 The importance of this 
is that the understanding of any act does not depend upon the act itself. "An act 
cannot be limited to itself; it refers immediately to more profound structures.' '116 
110. Ibid., p. 541. 
Ill. Ibid. 
112. Ibid., p. 542. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Ibid. 
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Instead of looking to the past or to a nature or to external determinism to 
understand a particular act, we must see "a turning back of the future toward the 
present. "117 Without in any way understanding a causal mechanism, an act is 
comprehensible only in terms of a project which is a projection of the for-itself 
toward self, toward a possible. Hence, any particular possible under consid-
eration refers to other possibles and, finally, "to the ultimate possibility which 1 
am."118 
This ultimate possibility which provides the structure for the intelligibility of 
this act is notjust one possible among others. Il is "the unitary synthesis of ail our 
actual possibles." 119 The particular possible which we can deliberately choose 
resides in the ultimate possibility until a particular circumstance places it in relief 
from the background of the synthesis "without, however, thereby supressing its 
quality as belonging to the totality." 120 As a result, Sartre would have us note 
carefully a very special relationship between the for-itself and the in-itself. The 
two are strictly co-relative. It is the con crete situation which makes this free 
possible stand out in relief against the fundamental project and yet, simultane-
ously, it is our fundamental project which makes the world appear to us as this 
situation and this complex of instruments. We choose the meaning of the world in 
choosing ourselves. Il is our project which gives the world its meaning at the same 
time that the world engenders this particular possible for us: 
thus the fundamental act of freedom is discovered; and it is this which gives 
meaning to the particular action which 1 can be brought to consider. This 
constantly renewed act is not distinct from my being; it is a choice of myself 
in the world and by the same token it is a discovery of the world. 121 
Incomprehensible, gratuitous conduct in particular actions, therefore, is 
eliminated from Sartre 's position. In one sense particlliar acts are rooted in the 
original project. Still they remain absolutely free. The fundamental project, how-
ever, is not one of deliberate choice becallse it is the foundation of deliberation 
and deliberation remains only "interpretation in terms of an original choice."122 
At the same time we cannot say that the fundamental and profound choice which 
is the original project is unconscious-we should say, rather, that it is one with 
consciousness. While the particular act is intelligible in terms of the fundamental 
project in which it is always involved and which in fact, permeates this act, the 
particular act remains contingent and unjllstifiable becallse both the particular 
action and the project remain wholly free. 
It is the foundation of our free acts, the original choice, made without a base 
of support which appears as absurdo Deliberative choices can be explained by 
recourse to the project. But the project is original in ail senses. It is absurd 
117. Ibid .• p. 561. 
118. Ibid .• p. 562. 
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because we cannot choose not to choose. It is absurd in the sense "'that the choice 
is that by which the very notion of the absurd receives a meaning." 12.1 
Given the necessity of choosing, Sartre says, wc are thrown back to the 
facticity of the for-itself. The for-itself is not its own foundation. If it were its own 
foundation then freedom would decide its own freedom and its own existence. 
This would suppose a for-itself confronted with the choice of itself as free or as 
not free and, in turn, merely refer us ta an original freedom whereby this choice 
could be made. The freedom of the for-itself is a given: the fact of not being able 
not to be free is the.fàcticity of freedom, and the fact of not being able not to exist 
is its contingency. "124 Hence the freedom of the for-itself is a given in a world of 
givens. But at the same time the world of givens, the situation, the coefficient of 
adversity, does not limit freedom. "The given (in the sense of situation) in no way 
enters into the constitution offreedom since freedom is interiorized as the internai 
negation of the given." 125 Freedom, on the contrary, is a relation to the situation 
such that situation and motivation are really one: 
we shall use the term situation for the contingency of freedom in the plenum 
of being of the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not 
to cons/rain freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as already illllminated 
by the end which freedom chooses.1 26 
So while we are not free not to be free, freedom is an escape from and a 
constitution of the factual given-but there remains the fact of this escape from 
and constitution of the factual given and it is this fact which is the facticity of 
freedom. The paradox of freedom lies in the fact that there is freedom only in a 
situation and that there is a situation only through freedom. 
What the fact of our freedom, of our being condemned to be free. implies is 
that we are fully responsible for our world since responsibility is "consciousness 
(of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object." 127 Si nce ail 
choices depend on our fundamental project we are the authors of our mode of 
being and of the situation and, consequently, we are responsible for both. Com-
plaint or excuse is senseless since nothing external can determine us and this 
means that there are no accidents in life. 
1 am responsible for everything, in fact, except for my very responsibility, for 
1 am not the foundation of my being. Therefore everything takes place as if 1 
were compelled to be responsible. 128 
It is this recognition of my absolute responsibility which gives ri se to the 
feeling of ahandonment: we are conscious of our solitude engaged in a world for 
123. Ihid., p. 586. 
124. Ihid., p. 595. ln common language we would say thal freedom is necessarily free. We must bear 
in mind, however. that Sartre defines necessity as a relation between ideal propositions. This is 
why he must designate our nol being able not to be free as factual contingency. 
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whieh we are wholly responsible. This is why the for-itself experienees itself as 
anguish and why "most of the time we tlee anguish in bad faith."129 
Finally. although man is al ways engaged in an effort to create himself by a 
free project for which he is wholly responsible, what remains to be examined is 
the meaning of his fundamental project. of his thrust toward being. What does the 
projeet represent in the relation to being-in-itself? How does man make himselfto 
be by this project? 
To answer this question we must return to the faet that the for-itselfis a being 
who se being is in question in the form of a project of being. It is what it is not. 
What properly characterizes the for-itself, therefore, is its lad of being; it is 
because of its lack of being that possibles appear as values. Value continually 
haunts the for-itself as the totality of being which is lacked. "The for-itself 
chooses because it is lack; freedom is really synonymous with lack. "130 Because 
man is fundamentally a lack of being, "fundamentally man is the desire ta be." 13 1 
Consequently, ail original projects, in spite of the infinity of possible projects, 
have this in common: each is a desire to be; each is the desire to be in-itself. "The 
being which the for-itself lacks is the in-itself. The for-itself arises as the nihilation 
of the in-itself and this nihilation is defined as the project toward the in-itself." 132 
ln other words. that which man continually seeks in whatever project he freely 
assumes is the quest of being what he is. "This is why the possible is projected in 
general as what the for-itself lacks in order to become in-itself." 133 The for-itself 
seeks to be for-itself as its own foundation: it seeks to be an ens causa sui: 
Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of hum an reality is 
to say that man is the being whose project is to be God ... God, value and 
supreme end of transeendence, represents the permanent limit in terms of 
which man makes known to himself what he is. To be man means to reach 
toward being God. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be 
GOd. 134 
AIthough freedom is identicaI with man's lack of being and his desire of 
being, and the meaning of the project is the desire to be God, this does not mean 
that at the core of human reality freedom has given way to a human nature or 
essence. "Freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence."135 Free-
dom remains the immediate upsurge toward being and essence remains a particu-
lar mode of being, merely one possible, a particular invention of self resulting 
from the fundamental project, the situation and concrete choices. While we can 
say that "the meaning of the desire (to be in-itself-for-itselt) is ultimately the 
project of being God, the desire is never constituted by this meaning; on the 
contrary it always represents a particular discovery of its ends." 136 
129. Ibid. , p. 681. 
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Man is not a conscious substance, rather he is consciousness seeking to be a 
substance, Desire stems from his lack of being and desire is always supported by 
the being which is lacked, The being of human reality can never be a substance 
but is condemned to being a lived relation, If we can say that man is the desire to 
be God it is al ways with the qualification that this effort is "without there being 
any given substratum for that effort, without there being anything which so 
endeavors." 137 
Human reality always remains a free project to metamorphose itself. to 
change itself from a for-itself to an in-itself-for-itself. But by definition its 
metamorphosis is a failure since the for-itself is what it is not and is not what it is. 
Never can it be what it is. 
Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found 
being, and by the same stroke to constitute the In-itself which escapes con-
tingency by being its own foundation, the ens causa sui, which religions cali 
God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ. for man loses 
himself as man in order that God may be bom. But the idea of God is 
contradictory and we Jose ourseJves in vain. Man is a useless passion. 138 
VI 
Critique of Sartre' s Position 
It is not by accident that Being and Nothingness should be such a massive, 
complex and difficult treatise. Sartre's subject matter demands il. Any attempt to 
explain human freedom must take into account the nature of man, his relation to 
the world in which he lives, his relation to others and, ultimately, to God. That 
Sartre recognizes the total scope of the problem he makes evident by the subtitle 
of Being and Nothingness-" An Essay On Phenomenological Ontology." In-
deed, the same sort of awareness of the dimensions of the problem led Leibniz to 
describe the question of freedom as one of the two labyrinths (the other being the 
problem of the one and the many) where reason often goes astray.139 
To those who have worked their way through Being and Nothingness, 
Leibniz' s metaphor of the labyrinth must seem strikingly appropriate. Many of the 
paths and by-ways invite further exploration either because of the excellence of 
Sartre's insights or because of almost shameless equivocations and contradic-
tions. But as interesting as these particular paths may be it is still with the work 
as-a-whole that we must be concerned. Sartre can lead us into the labyrinth, but 
he cannot lead us out. "Man is a useless passion" is a cry of despair. 
The real difficulty with Sartre's position is that he is lost from the very start. 
Wh en Theseus went into the labyrinth he carefully unwound the bail of string. 
Sartre takes no such precautions. Yet common sense would seem to dictate that if 
we wish 10 examine human freedom we should begin our analysis with our experi-
137. Ihid., p. 705. 
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139. Cf. Preface to the Theodicy, tr. E.H. Huggard (London, 1951), p. 53. 
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ence of ourselves as choosing subjects. Instead, Sartre's point of departure is one 
whieh does violence to experienee and it is this faet which seems to provoke 
resistance on the part of the reader (for the difficulty of the subject and the length 
of the work are not obstacles to the serious reader). From the very outset Sartre 
portrays man as anti-physis-and this in an abso/ute way. Human reality is re-
duced to consciousness arising in an absolute upsurge out of, and in opposition to. 
an absurd, superfluolls, contingent world. Sartre takes us out of the world in 
which we live, to which we are related, in which we make choices, and he sets us 
in opposition to it. We are uprooted and cut off from nourishment. Our roots in the 
natural world are severed. lt is a strangely fitting image that absurdity and the 
meaning ofnausea are brought home to Roquentin in Sartre's philosophical noveL 
La Nausée, by means of the roots of the chestnut tree in the park. 
By defining man in opposition to nature (such that man has no nature), Sartre 
can make freedom (Jack of nature) absolute since it can no longer be a quality of a 
natural being. To say that freedom precedes essence or, to use his more popular 
expression, "existence precedes essence", allows Sartre to ignore for ail practical 
purposes the foundation in being of the being-for-itself. Sartre is content to simply 
mention the 'facticity' of the for-itself. The embarassment of the for-itself acting 
in a determinate way (a point to be considered later), bothers Sartre not in the 
least. He dismisses this as the absurdity offreedom. But it is only as absurd as his 
starting point. Sartre would reduce man to existence, but surely questions about 
the existence of something can only be answered by paying close attention to the 
sort of thing it is. Sartre has nothing to say about oak trees and butterflies. They 
are dismissed to that opaque world of being-in-itself. The foundation of the for-
itself whereby it is a particular in-itself is dismissed in the sa me way. Of course, if 
we ignore the world w(: will also distort our perspective of ourselves in it. -
Sartre chooses instead to build his foundations with the cogito. And although 
he uses it in a way different from that of Descartes (since for Sartre it is always 
co-relative to the world), he succeeds in perpetuating the carte sian dichotomy. 
The labels change but not the realities. Descartes' dualism is consciousness and 
the world; Sartre's is being-for-itself and being-in-itself-two "completely dis-
tinct" realms of being. Consciousness provides the separation. There is an impor-
tant difference between Sartre's for-itself(which is what it is not and is not what it 
is) and Aristotle's knower (to know is to be the other as other). For Aristotle, 
knowledge is a principle of unification and, through knowledge, man "can becorne 
ail things." For Sartre, on the other hand, knowledge isolates us from the world. 
It reveals to us only 'otherness'. Consciousness denies of itself that of which it is 
conscious. This 'nihilating', the power to conceive negatively, is the only real 
function which Sartre attributes to the cogito and it is the key to Sartre's whole 
position. Forlorness, abandonment, nausea, absurdity al! stem from Sartre' s first 
principle. Man stands in isolation and alienation, an individual, unable to relate 
to others, stripped of the capacity to love and to share. Everything and everyone 
becomes nihilated. Al! relations, whether with others, or God, or the world must 
necessarily be relations of conflict. When the conclusions are viewed in relation to 
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Sartre' s first principle it becomes apparent that a little distortion goes a long way. 
To treat human reality as consciousness is to destroy man as man. 
The selection of consciousness as a point of departure engenders other prob-
lems as weiL How are the 1wo distinct realms ofbeing to be reunited in the project 
of the authentic self? If consciousness (the for-itselt) through its activity of nihila-
tion presents liS only with an impersonal other, then how are we to escape the 
sterility of consciousness'? It is import.:,nt to note that the cogito does not engage 
us in action. Our awareness of the other as other does not involve us in the pursuit 
of the other as good. The problem, therefore, is to understand how Sartre gets 
from the cognitive order to the appetitive order, from otherness to the dc-
sideratum, What is the foundation for lad and mll/c'? 
Since Sartre cannot answer this on the basis of the cogito, he resolves the 
prohlem by simple fiat: the for-itself, since it is outside of the domain of the 
in-itself, is .!i'eedom. And once Sartre has simply identified consciousness and 
freedom he can then introducc the notion of 'the project'. (The 'fundamental 
project'. however, is a notion that Sartre is consistently incapable of handling.l 
It is somewhat ironical that 'the project', perhaps the most practical and 
valuable aspect of Sartre' s philosophy, does not have any real dependence on 
Sartre's own first principles. As he incorporates it into his philosophy another 
important resemblance between Sartre and Descartes appears. Descartes can only 
escape the prison of consciousness by sleight of hand, so to speak or, more 
properly, by manipulation of language. Descartes slips a content (a personal T) 
into the cogito when the real conclusion, of course. should have been 'cogitatur' 
(there is thinking going on). Sartre is capable of similar verbal shenanigans in his 
passage from the cognitive to the appetitive order. 140 It is accompli shed by 
equivocating with the "for" in the "for-itself'. The for-itself. as consciousness, is 
merely a point of reference on the world which is present "for me", By the time 
that the object of consciousness has become identified with lad and value, . 'for" 
has assumed the meaning of "for the sake of" or purpose .141 
Since the power to act does not come from consciousness, neither can con-
sciousness be identiîïed with freedom even if knowledge is a necessary condition 
of the free act. Instead, the foundation of freedom must lie in the demands of a 
being-in-itself whereby both consciousness and freedom belong to a particular 
kind of being wit h a nature to fulfill. 'ï am not free not to be free" only becomes 
absurd when man's nature is ignored rather than explored. As a consequence, the 
thrust towards the fullness of being which is lacking must be relative to the 
essential being that we are. 
Sartre's failure to begin with what is truly human reality leads him inevitably 
into contradictory conclusions. At the outset of Being and Nothingness we are 
faced with the task of seeking "the authentic self' only to finLi out later that this 
consists of a "synthetic unit y" of the in-itself and the for-itself which is an "im-
140. 1 dll nol mean to suggcst thal il is done dcliberately. 
141. This is even more evident in the French "pour-soi". 
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possible synthesis." Authenticity, if we are to be led by Sartre, involves being a 
"useless passion" since the meaning of the fundamental project is to be ens causa 
sui, the desire to be God ("but the idea of God in contradictory .... ") How can 
the 'self' be the in-itself-for-itself when we are told that being-in-itself does not 
enter into any relation with what is not itself? Finally, of course, if we did become 
in-itself-for-itself, our fullness of being would be our nothingness of being. 
At times, there is even some cause to suspect that in his attempt to make man 
absolutely free, Sartre cornes close to stripping man completely offreedom. "Man 
is condemned to be free." But is he then free at ail? Again the problem arises 
because of Sartre 's emphasis on the cogito. The for-itself determines itself against 
that of which it is conscious by means of negation. However, it is on the basis of 
that negation that 'Iack' alises and it is because of that which is lacked that desire 
and value appear. Similarly, when Sartre stiplilates that freedom only takes place 
in a situation, we should bear in mind that by freedom he means the internaI 
negation of the given. The identification of freedom with 'nothingness' comes 
very close to determinism. Perhaps one of the most haunting images ofBeing and 
Nothingness is that of the ass dragging the cart whilc pursuing the carrot. Sartre 
uses it to portray the futility of attempting to escape 'freedom', the futility of the 
human condition. But the image is also one of pelfect mechanism. 
At other times, particularly in his analysis of the structure of freedom , Sartre 
speaks in an entirely different manner by stressing freedom with respect to choice 
rather than to 'nothingness'. Here, he qllite lightly situates freedom within the 
context of intentionality rather than consciollsness. But a careflll analysis shows 
us that even within this context freedom cannot be absolute. 
Choice, like consciousness, is not empty; choice is always between possibles 
and possibles, as Sartre affirms, appear on the grollnd of intention. This means 
that it is the intentional end pursued (the project) which is responsible for the 
appearance of possible means among which a choice is made. It is in this sense 
that intention is involved in the act of choice since it is the principle which directs 
the choice. But what is the foundation or the ground of the intention which makes 
this particular choice possible? Sartre fully realizes the necessity of an ultimate 
intention (the fllndamental prQject). However, he then calls the fundamental pro-
ject "an original choice". But if the fundamental project or ultimate intention is a 
choice, what grollnds it? He has already shown that no choice can be made 
without an intention which causes the possible means to appear. At this point, 
Sartre calls freedom "absllrd" because it "goes beyond reason". But a magical 
use of words does not dispose of the contradiction. Either the fundamental project 
is not a choice (and freedom is not absolllte) or it is not fllndamental. Sartre cannot 
have it both ways. If the project is fundamental, then it cannot be chosen: it is 
necessary. Ifit is a choice, then it cannot be the fllndamental project. Ultimately, 
there must be sorne determinism in order for freedom to exist-but the deter-
minism must be such that freedom is still possible. 
A former professor to whom 1 am deeply indebted, M. Jacques de Monléon, 
once made the teHing observation that a philosophy which begins in epistemology 
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ends in des pair. Sartre's philosophy is not an exception, Yet Sartre's point of 
departure and his ultimate failure are due to his own myopia. The real unit y of the 
in-itself and the for-itself which is the self is continually present but ignored. 
"Consciousness is bound to the in-itself by an internai relation ... so as to consti-
tute a totality .142 Is not the search for a synthetic unit y . therefore, a vain quest? 
Intrinsic unit y is already present and the relation between the in-itself and the 
for-itself is not one of duality but of unit y . The whole man has his foundation in 
being. 
Consciousness, then, is not human reality but an integral part of human 
reality. As a result, man's nothingness of being is not absolute. Neither in his 
freedom. Rather, these are relative to the kind of being that we are. Our existence 
is a real one in a real world, with a nature which is given and a completeness that is 
lacking. This should have been the paradox worth y of Sartre's considerable tal-
ents. 
142. Being and Nothingness, p. 760. 
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